Military Discussion : Battle of Moscow (Operation Typhoon 1941)

Will Russia surrender / sue for peace with Germany if Moscow is capture


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Sjourn said:
Kudos to the admin:thumbsup:

It was a major under estimation of Germany to take on Russia, this piece of histroy was the turning point of the war. Had germany just stuck with Europe and anchored there, how long do you think the war would have lasted? my assumption would be 10 more years...

On paper at least, the Germans had the overwhelming superiority. 3 million German troops (all better trained) vs 1.8 million Russian troops, at the start of the Russian campaign. What the Germans did not anticipate was the speed at which the Russians could build up their army. By the end of the war the Red Army had conscripted 12 million troops, 8 million of whom were killed. At the height of the German advance upon Moscow, even though the Red Army lost 3 million men, they had conscripted 3 million fresh troops from Siberia to replace the men they lost. These men were tougher, and by then better equipped than the Germans. German morale was greatly sapped when they first encountered these Siberian fighters. The biggest difference between the Germans and the Red Army was while the German Army was gradually depleted, the Red Army continued to grow in strength, in numbers, morale and military expertise. An interview with Marshal Georgi Zhukov revealed the fundamental difference between the mentality of the German and Russian troops during the war. Zhukov said, "When we encountered a minefield, we carried on attacking as if the minefield wasn't there." It was therefore no surprise that the Red Army was first to reach Berlin, by routing a German force four times as large as the one facing the Allies on the Western Front.
 

Some points/info for thought i found on the web. Although the general consensus all round, mine included, is that the Soviets would not have surrended but would have made it a more brutal longer fight. hope to hear what the rest of you guys can expand on about these points. I'd be happy to supply links, lots lots more out there to read.

Credit to the original posters/authors.

Why the Soviets wouldn't have given up. Factory relocations stats:
- "On June 23rd, 41 mobilisation production plans went into force.
On June 24th, the Evacuation Council was set up
On the 30th, the State Defense Committee was organised with Stalin as its head.
In July '41, 300,000 railway wagons were in operation
in August 185,000 " " " " "
in September 140,000 " " " " "
in October 175,000 " " " " "
in November 123,000. " " " " "
In the July-November period 1,503 industrial enterprises were evacuated to the east.
It took two and a half years to erect a blast furnace before the war but furnaces No. 5 and 8 were erected in eight monthes at Magnitogorsk.
In October tank building plant No.183 was working
in November it was evacuated and in December it resumed production. Tank production
went from 4,177 in the second half of '41 to 11,021 in the first half of '42.
Military production increased 180% in the urals in 1942 compared to '41, 200% in the Volga area and 140% in Western Siberia.
In 1942 4.4 million industrial workers were trained or re-educated. The number of women operating for example forging and press machines rose from 11% 1941 to 50% end of '42.
The Germans siezed or put out of action 31,850 big and small industrial enterprises.
German industrial capacity in 41 including conquered countries was :-
31.8 million tons of steel against the Soviets 18.3
rolled stock 22.5 m.tons against Soviets 13.1
coal 506mt against Soviets 165.9mt
stock of metal cutting machines 1694 thousand Soviet 58.4 thousand

From an article by Colonell G.S. Kravchenko 1967

"There had been only scant pre-war contingency planning, there were no actual plans for any strategic industrial withdrawl into the eastern hinterlands, where the building of new plants and the construction of new railways had proceeded very slowly"........."the highly centralised state machine was scattered behind the Volga"......."the very lowest echolons of the Party and administrative machine proved to be inflexable to the point of inertia".

From John Erickson The Road To Stalingrad. " Steve

- "..... The first T34 from Zavod no. 183 (largest pre-war tank factory) was completed at Nizhni Tagil in the Urals on Dec. 8th '42 with the workers apparently living in tents, but pre war production at 183 was not reached till March '42 and it started its move on the 15th of September to the Urals (Soviet claims should always be taken with a pinch of salt).
It would seem that plant workers after 1941 typicaly comprised 50% women 15% underage
boys and 15% invalids and old men. Equipment was redesigned, the T34s model 1941 gun
had 861 parts and its model 1942 gun 614.
The cost per T34 in manpower and metal was reduced from 269,000 roubles in '41 to
135,000 by '43. Total T34 production for 1942 was 12,553 and for 40/41 about 3,100." Steve
 

Would the Soviets have given up?
Impact of the fall of Moscow on the Soviet system

- Stalin and other key Soviet leaders, along with a lot of other people from Moscow and the vicinity have escaped and gone deeper into Russia. Soviet transportation and industry are disrupted by the cutoff of Moscow, but the Soviets are cranking out new equipment at a very high rate, and new divisions are being trained and equipped almost as quickly as existing ones are destroyed.

At the same time, Stalin faces a dilemma. The troops trapped in the Moscow pocket will get weaker as time goes on. The actual fall of the capital could have a major impact on Soviet morale. Also, the Germans now control a very large part of the Russian heartland, along with a large part of the Russian population of the Soviet Union. That reduces the base Stalin has to draw on as he rebuilds his army. It also shifts the composition of that army, giving him a higher percentage of less reliable ethnic groups to draw on.

- Adding to Stalin's difficulties is the fact that Moscow is a transportation hub. The Soviet rail network becomes a lot less useful without it. Also, for morale reasons Stalin was not able to evacuate a lot of the Kremlin bureaucracy until the last moment. As a result, many of the faceless planners that make the Soviet economy work are still trapped in the Moscow pocket. Without good communication with those planners, Soviet industry is already starting to fall into confusion.

- Although Moscow falls, thousands of soviet troops, those not surrended or dead by starvation, break out of the pocket and stage hit & run raids against german forces.
Several million civilians die from starvation.

- Once the Soviet troops in the pocket become militarily insignificant, Stalin is no longer interested. His propaganda machine emphasizes that Russians destroyed Moscow to deny it to the invaders, just as they did when Napoleon invaded.

(summaries & excerpts from The Moscow Option, Alternate History by Dale Cozort)

- "Moscow was the centre of the transport net in European Russia and although there were lateral rail lines connecting the northern and southern theatres of the front, they were single track lines with a low transport capacity. The most important rail traffic was directed through Moscow. The only other major rail network in European Russia was located in the Donets basin (southern Ukraine).
....
It would have proceeded and (most likely) been followed by a succession of huge Soviet military defeats – (Soviet casualties in the first 6 months of the war amounted to nearly 6 million!!). Given the nature of the Soviet state under Stalin where power was centralized in the hands of one man ruling from a capital which, at that time, was considered to be the centre of world revolution the psychological/symbolic impact on the ordinary Red Army soldier of Stalin actually having vacate the Kremlin would have been enormous.

Also, bear in mind, that in 1941, America had not entered the war – so there was no realistic prospect of a second front or the arrival of significant western aid. Also, consider that during this period there was no indication that the Red Army would be able to improve its combat performance against the Wehrmacht. The Soviet reserves from the Eastern USSR that were deployed against the German Army in the Winter of 41/42 were for the most part unavailable during the Summer/Autumn 41 – they were either still being formed or guarding against a possible renewed attack by the Japanese."

"However, what I think is important to consider, is that the loss of the USSR’s main communications/transport centre would have severely impeded the Red Army’s ability to counteract subsequent Germans advances for the remainder of 1941 and probably well into 1942. It is this command and control paralysis which combined with the loss of the most important symbol of Stalin’s power in Russia that made capture of Moscow so important.

One can well argue – as nearly all historians now do - that given the subsequent course of events in WWII (America’s entry into the war, the huge Anglo-American lend-lease program to the USSR, the allied second front in western Europe, Hitler’s war direction, German occupation policies etc etc………), German defeat was inevitable." taylorjohn21
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zaren said:
... An interview with Marshal Georgi Zhukov revealed the fundamental difference between the mentality of the German and Russian troops during the war. Zhukov said, "When we encountered a minefield, we carried on attacking as if the minefield wasn't there." It was therefore no surprise that the Red Army was first to reach Berlin, by routing a German force four times as large as the one facing the Allies on the Western Front.

If the russian troops refused to go into the minefield, wouldn't they have been shot for cowardice? That's a recorded fact, ya, call of duty also have. lolz. Still, i suppose that can be intepreted as 'motivation'.

ps. COD: well not the minefield part. but raw recruits refusing to advance under fire.
 

IMHO, Russia will not surrender nor sue for peace.

1) The Germany, even though, more in numbers and superior in hardware than the the Russian, the Germany army was poorly equiped for winter war. The Russian winter was can be extremely harsh. The Germany army wore summer fatigues which stood out like a sore thumb against the white winner snow. Easy target for snippers.

2) The Germany army over estimated their own strength.

3) Long supply lines and poorly protected. Easy targets for the cossack. (off course the cossack were later crucify by Stanlin).

4) Russian while retreating, burnt houses, fields, food, forcing the Germans to pump supplies to the front under difficult conditions.

5) Basically, they made the same mistakes as Napolean did. Napolean did make it all the way to moscow.
 

foxtwo said:
The cost per T34 in manpower and metal was reduced from 269,000 roubles in '41 to 135,000 by '43. Total T34 production for 1942 was 12,553 and for 40/41 about 3,100." Steve

This says its all. 12,553 units of T34! They're going all out to defend. Any military force will shiver at the thought of going head to head with 12,553 tanks that are superior at that time.
 

Frankly the Operation Barbarossa is a plan to fail. Like many have to point out poor supply line, wrong supply(no or limted winter supplies), over confident that they will be in Moscow before winter, poor infromations on russian strength and Hitler poor judements.

Hitler comitted so many resources trying to break Stalingrad instead of go around it, that cause the Greman to lost the important prize which is the oilfields in Caucasus. Hitler have many time refuse to listern to his officers like he forbid any withdraw on the front even things are bad for the Greman commanders on the field. Even they made it to moscow, Stalin had already made plans to move to the east and counter attack once spring in 43. Stalin still have a huge country and resources to recurit and arm his armies even he lose his captial.

So with Gremany fighting on two fronts, poor supplies operation, the hash winter in 42 and mistakes made by Hitler. Even they reach Moscow. As things unfold Stalin will able to see things are going his way, then there nothing stopping him to take revenge on his ex allies.
 

The loss of moscow and it's transportation network would be a blow to the Soviets but it is unlikely that it would cause the Soviets to surrender. They have still vast tracts of land and a large population from which to draw their soldiers. While this may have thrown the eventual outcome of the war in doubt, the Soviets still hold more cards.

Typhoon, and by extension, Barbarossa, was simply doomed due to the scale of it's ambition. As the Wehrmacht advance deeper into Russia, it faces the problem of holding an ever widening frontline and at the same time, defending the rear to protect it's supply lines. Let's not forget that the territory behind them remain hostile and hence a lot of resources would need to be committed to defend these areas. The scorched earth policy practiced by the Soviets also made things worse as the German troops could not live off the land.

Hitler's belief was that the Russians would rise to throw off the yoke of communism. He said "We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down". But this was misguided as he underestimated the pride and bravery of the soviet people. And the fact that his soldiers acted more as conquerors than liberators and the acts of cruelty by the less savoury elements of his army (particularly against the Jewish citizens) ensured that the soviet people would fight him to the death than submit.

And while better equipped and trained, the Wehrmacht was handicapped when forced into urban warfare (as any army would be). The enclosed streets and rubbles foiled their greatest weapon, mobility. their panzers are less effective and rendered vulnerable when traversing the rubble strewn streets, so full of ambush positions. and in urban warfare, guts, quick reactions and sheer luck can oversome the most stringent training and the best equipment.
Look at Army Group North, they encircled but never took Leningrad, and Army Group Centre's 6th Army perished in the ruins of Stalingrad. The best plan really would have been to encircle but not attack the cities. If the Germans could move past Stalingrad, after neutralising it with a blocking force and move on the the oil fields, and if Typhoon had gone ahead earlier instead of being delayed for the seizure of the Ukraine (and allowing winter to set in), anything could happen. The Wehrmacht operated best when on the move and should never be pinned down in street fighting. Cut off the oil from the Soviets and things could be different...maybe.

And here, I'd really feel that if the Luftwaffe had looked at the possibility of developing long-ranged strategic bombers, the tide of war could have been different. The Luftwaffe had focused more on medium and close-support bombers, a great choice for supporting the advance of the ground forces. but the Soviets had moved their industry and weapons factories deep into the Urals and these bombers could not operate so deep into Soviet union. A focused strategic bombing campaign of these facilities as well as on the vital rail lines linking Siberia and Asiatic Soviet Union to the frontlines could have had a devastating effect.

lastly, I hope no one misunderstands. I think I speak for all of us posting here that while we like to discuss things that happened in wars, military matters, etc, i am sure any one us would do anything to prevent these wars if we could and would never encourage a real war or acts of violence against anyone.
 

Zplus said:
Ah.... the Panther, one of the best tanks of that era. I thought it was already fielded when operations in Russia takes place. Its just that there weren't enough. The only thing it learned from the russion tanks were the sloped armour.:)

Just like the Me262... too few to win a war...

Panther, my favourite tanks of WW2. if i remembered correctly, the panther first saw action in Operation Citadel in Kursk and these were early models which broke down frequently. The Panther was designed only after the Germans realised that the T-34s were far superior to their panzers. This prompted the development of the Panthers, Tigers and the modified Panzer IV Ausf G (my other fave :) ). But by the time these see service, the tide of war had turned against the Germans and they were always on the back foot since then.

As for the Me262, there were indeed many produced but the Allies brilliantly hit at the one big Archilles heel of the jets. they need lots of fuel and the allied targeted the oil production facilities and ensured these fine planes never took to the air in enough numbers to turn the tide of the war.
 

giddygoat said:
And here, I'd really feel that if the Luftwaffe had looked at the possibility of developing long-ranged strategic bombers, the tide of war could have been different. The Luftwaffe had focused more on medium and close-support bombers, a great choice for supporting the advance of the ground forces. but the Soviets had moved their industry and weapons factories deep into the Urals and these bombers could not operate so deep into Soviet union. A focused strategic bombing campaign of these facilities as well as on the vital rail lines linking Siberia and Asiatic Soviet Union to the frontlines could have had a devastating effect.

well said the lack of 4 engines long range heavy bombers seriously hampered the luftwaffe ability to go into strategic bombing partly due to hilter himself rejecting plans to build heavy bomber.
 

perhaps the most powerful tanks for russia during world war 2.

T-34 M40
sj_pkw3.jpg

Mass-produced medium tank of revolutionary design. The early version is distinguishable by its small turret and peculiarly shaped gun mantle. It had tremendous firepower: a 76.2 mm 76L35 cannon that was twice as big as its German rivals' guns, and could rip open any tank it met. Powered by a 500 HP engine, it could travel at 40 km/h cross-country. Mud and snow presented no handicap for its wide tracks. Although the German Panther was technically better in the same class, the sheer numbers in which the T-34 was produced (10,760) made it a more significant player on the battlefield. It was probably the most important tank of the Allied forces, and had a great impact on many subsequent designs.

KV-2
sj_pkw5.jpg

Heavy battle tank named after Red Army founder, Klement Voroshilov. It was a nightmare for the Germans during the Russian Campaign. A huge turret and a 152 mm howitzer made the over 50-ton monster a tough nut to crack for enemy AT guns. It was easier to hit than to damage - sometimes even several direct hits failed to bring it to a permanent stop. A single KV-2 managed to hold up a whole German motorized division during their invasion of the Ukraine. Positioned next to a main road leading through marshy ground, it destroyed one vehicle after another, took out half a dozen batteries and blocked the German advance for over 48 hours before its crew of six ran out of ammo and decided to abandon their immobilized tank. Only 330 KV-2's were built between 1940 and 1941, as the production facilities were captured by the Germans

IS-2
sj_pkw6.jpg

Heavy battle tank named after Josef Stalin; a true monstrosity on par with the KV series it replaced. Its crew of four used a 122 mm main gun, which could penetrate all existing armor at the time - even the German King Tiger needed to be careful when engaging the IS-2. The Russians used the IS-2 in the final battle for Berlin with devastating results. An observer of a fight between an IS-2 and a Panther reported the Russian shell penetrated the Panther's front armor and left through the rear of the tank before exploding. Shortly after its introduction, Russian engineers noticed that the German 75 mm gun could penetrate the IS-2 from all sides. The consequence was the development of the IS-2M with stronger front armor angled at 60 degrees - incoming shells often ricocheted or bounced away from it. Between 1944 and 1945, 3,475 IS-2's were produced
 

panther versions

Panzerkampfwagen V "Panther" SdKfz 171 Ausf. A
de_pkw7.jpg

Tough times began for the Wehrmacht with the appearance of the Russian T-34 medium tank. It was far superior to all German panzers of the time: its tilted armor deflected most projectiles like tennis balls. To counter the threat of the mass-deployed T-34, German experts suggested copying it, but they lacked a suitable engine as well as the necessary fuel. They began constructing a new panzer utilizing the tilted armor and the wide tracks of the T-34. The resulting "Panther" was drastically different from earlier German tank designs. Manufacture of Revision A started in August 1942. The standard MG loophole was replaced with an MG 34 fitted into a rotating sphere. This model was also equipped with armor skirts. The gunner was able to target objects over a distance of 2,000 meters with his long barreled 75 mm cannon. Every 4th shot was a direct hit when using rapid automatic fire: despite the recoil, the Panther was still capable of precise targeting.

Panzerkampfwagen V "Panther" SdKfz 171 Ausf. D

(same image as above)

Despite the various construction problems, 250 of the "Panther" A version went into service during the Battle of Kursk, leading to a dropout of 80% of the Panthers in day one. Production of Revision D started in December 1943. The gunner could target objects over a distance of 2,000 meters with his long barreled 75 mm cannon. Every 4th shot was a direct hit using rapid automatic fire. The engineers delivered brilliant work with the undercarriage: no wartime tank came close to the Panther in terms of absorption and suspension. Considered to be one of the best weapons of WWII, the resourceful combination of weaponry, armor and speed made the Panther extremely dangerous. It was able to destroy every Allied tank it encountered, and was feared even by T-34 crews
 

the tiger family

Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" SdKfz 181 Ausf. E
de_pkw9.jpg

Entered service in July 1942 as an answer to the threat posed by mass-produced Allied tanks. Its strongest asset was the 88 mm main gun derived from the infamous Flak 88 anti-aircraft cannon. At a distance of 1,800 meters, its projectiles penetrated each and every enemy vehicle, while the Allied tanks had to be quite close to the "Tiger" to penetrate its 10 cm hull plating. Even if the distance was sufficient, the enemy tank only had a chance of success if the Tiger was hit from the right angle. If the German driver was guarding the angle towards the enemy optimally, his tank was de facto invincible.
Although the commander, driver, shooter, loader and radio operator could always rely on the enormous firepower and strong armor of their "cat of prey", its 650 hp engine caused frequent problems. The tank was not sufficiently motorized with it and its frequent stalls and failures regularly caused dangerous situations. Even in later revisions, these problems could never be fully eliminated. Another weakness of the tiger was its dependence on terrain conditions. With a weight of 57 tons, it was better off avoiding muddy grounds.

Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger II/King Tiger" SdKfz 182 Ausf. B
de_pkw10.jpg

Heavy battle tank delivered by Henschel between January and September 1944. Several of the 500 original units remained in service until the end of the war, through Operation Market Garden, the Ardennes Offensive, Hungary, Poland and the defense of Berlin. Despite being an upgrade of the Tiger I, the " Tiger II" differed quite drastically from its predecessor. It was armed with the new 88 mm KwK 43 L/71 cannon, which was able to penetrate 28 cm of steel over a distance of 1 km, making it the most powerful weapon of the war. Even over a distance of 3.5 km, it was still able to pierce every Allied tank before it needed to fight back. Armor plating was further improved over that of the Tiger I. Consequently, it feared no enemy tanks with the exception of the Russian IS-2 and IS-3. The Tiger II was the pride of German armored forces and immediately achieved "terrifying" status with the Allies. Its biggest drawback was its own highly advanced technology: more King Tigers were disabled by mechanical breakdowns than by enemy tanks. Often the crew of five had no other choice but to abandon and destroy their paralyzed vehicle.
 

All I can say is that all was planned that way........before everything happens. And everything happens for a reason. Only the Almighty One knows. :what:
 

Well, Hilter made a lot of mistakes during this war.
But do you guys things situation will change, what if Hilter have not occur this mistakes.

Let see it in the stragetic point of view.

Suppose Operation Babarossa was launch in 22 May 1941 as per original schedule, one precious month ahead.
(In real life, it was launch in 22 June 1941 due to delay cause by other opearation elsewhere)

And let say by 26th June 1941, German Army Group Centre have reach Smolensk, Russian defence have collapse and the road to Moscow was left open and undefend to the Germans.
(Germany still have 90% combat ready as it happen the same in real life)
And the main strength of German Army Group Centre and part of Army Group North and South thrust towards Moscow.

Moscow encircle in July and Winter have no arrive.
The Russian government and office withdrawn to inner Russia but Stalin choose to stay behind.
(It happen also on real life in Dec 1941 which Stalin decide to stay in Moscow)

Moscow was seige, surrender, 700,000 troops and Stalin capture.
German announce to whole Russia that Moscow is liberate from comminusm rule instead of capture.

What will Russain generals in Far East do next ?
Some generals dun like Stalin.

Hee hee...... :devil:
 



i don't think that stalin would have stayed all the way till moscow is taken. more likely he'd leave when things get hopeless. after all, even when the sixth army was trapped in the "kessel" at stalingrad, there were still flights out. it is likely that stalin stayed to inspire the troops but would leave at the end rather than be captured. he's already moved the government aparatus to inner russia so this would suggest that they intend to fight on after the fall of moscow. and i think the atrocities carried out by the german troops would have lost them any credit even if hitler declares the "liberation" rather than the capture of moscow.

however, if the germans did manage to go this far and still avoid major losses, things can get interesting. the eastern front troops are the cream of the wehrmacht, consisting of many experienced and battle-hardened units. certainly, this can pose a serious threat to the survival of the soviets.

but i still think that the soviets would still hold the edge in the long term. if need be, stalin can muster his troops as deep as irkutz or valdivostok, a world away from moscow. it's a matter of time but the millions of russian troops would still be trained and sent to battle.
no matter how quick the germans can advance, they can never cover enough of russia to prevent this. the key to any battle is to pursue and harry the retreating force to not give them time to regroup but russia is simply to large. although, like i suggested, had the luftwaffe had the capacity to mount a strategic bombing campaign on industries, supported by raids on administrative and transportation infrastructures by parachute and glider forces, this could perhaps keep the russians on the back foot enough for the germans forces to advance deep into russia.

but here again is another problem. the german supply lines are stretched. how long can they advance? the troops are tired and they have thousand of miles of hostile territory behind them. the deeper they go, the more vulnerable they are to being cut off by partisan attacks to the rear.

in fact, hitler was trying actively to draw the japanese into war against the Soviets Union. this would open a second front and almost certainly then, kill off uncle joe and his merry men. but the japanese had their eye on the pacific instead and had planned on hitting pearl harbour, apparently without hitler even knowing about it.
 

giddygoat said:
in fact, hitler was trying actively to draw the japanese into war against the Soviets Union. this would open a second front and almost certainly then, kill off uncle joe and his merry men. but the japanese had their eye on the pacific instead and had planned on hitting pearl harbour, apparently without hitler even knowing about it.

man if the japanese didn't commit that surprise attack on pearl harbour,they wouldn't got those two big atomic bombs.
and the us marines in the pacific front wouldn't capture tawara to lauch their bombers into attacking tokyo.
opps OT here.
 

Simon_84 said:
man if the japanese didn't commit that surprise attack on pearl harbour,they wouldn't got those two big atomic bombs.
and the us marines in the pacific front wouldn't capture tawara to lauch their bombers into attacking tokyo.
opps OT here.

And we'll all be speaking Japanese and getting Canons and Nikons made in Japan....
:confused:

SLS will become like akihabara.... :dunno:
 

T-34/85
I built a model of it (1:35 scale), these are the photos:
IMG_0726bwa.jpg


IMG_0729a.jpg


IMG_0725bwa.jpg
 

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