Would the Soviets have given up?
Impact of the fall of Moscow on the Soviet system
- Stalin and other key Soviet leaders, along with a lot of other people from Moscow and the vicinity have escaped and gone deeper into Russia. Soviet transportation and industry are disrupted by the cutoff of Moscow, but the Soviets are cranking out new equipment at a very high rate, and new divisions are being trained and equipped almost as quickly as existing ones are destroyed.
At the same time, Stalin faces a dilemma. The troops trapped in the Moscow pocket will get weaker as time goes on. The actual fall of the capital could have a major impact on Soviet morale. Also, the Germans now control a very large part of the Russian heartland, along with a large part of the Russian population of the Soviet Union. That reduces the base Stalin has to draw on as he rebuilds his army. It also shifts the composition of that army, giving him a higher percentage of less reliable ethnic groups to draw on.
- Adding to Stalin's difficulties is the fact that Moscow is a transportation hub. The Soviet rail network becomes a lot less useful without it. Also, for morale reasons Stalin was not able to evacuate a lot of the Kremlin bureaucracy until the last moment. As a result, many of the faceless planners that make the Soviet economy work are still trapped in the Moscow pocket. Without good communication with those planners, Soviet industry is already starting to fall into confusion.
- Although Moscow falls, thousands of soviet troops, those not surrended or dead by starvation, break out of the pocket and stage hit & run raids against german forces.
Several million civilians die from starvation.
- Once the Soviet troops in the pocket become militarily insignificant, Stalin is no longer interested. His propaganda machine emphasizes that Russians destroyed Moscow to deny it to the invaders, just as they did when Napoleon invaded.
(summaries & excerpts from The Moscow Option, Alternate History by Dale Cozort)
- "Moscow was the centre of the transport net in European Russia and although there were lateral rail lines connecting the northern and southern theatres of the front, they were single track lines with a low transport capacity. The most important rail traffic was directed through Moscow. The only other major rail network in European Russia was located in the Donets basin (southern Ukraine).
....
It would have proceeded and (most likely) been followed by a succession of huge Soviet military defeats – (Soviet casualties in the first 6 months of the war amounted to nearly 6 million!!). Given the nature of the Soviet state under Stalin where power was centralized in the hands of one man ruling from a capital which, at that time, was considered to be the centre of world revolution the psychological/symbolic impact on the ordinary Red Army soldier of Stalin actually having vacate the Kremlin would have been enormous.
Also, bear in mind, that in 1941, America had not entered the war – so there was no realistic prospect of a second front or the arrival of significant western aid. Also, consider that during this period there was no indication that the Red Army would be able to improve its combat performance against the Wehrmacht. The Soviet reserves from the Eastern USSR that were deployed against the German Army in the Winter of 41/42 were for the most part unavailable during the Summer/Autumn 41 – they were either still being formed or guarding against a possible renewed attack by the Japanese."
"However, what I think is important to consider, is that the loss of the USSR’s main communications/transport centre would have severely impeded the Red Army’s ability to counteract subsequent Germans advances for the remainder of 1941 and probably well into 1942. It is this command and control paralysis which combined with the loss of the most important symbol of Stalin’s power in Russia that made capture of Moscow so important.
One can well argue – as nearly all historians now do - that given the subsequent course of events in WWII (America’s entry into the war, the huge Anglo-American lend-lease program to the USSR, the allied second front in western Europe, Hitler’s war direction, German occupation policies etc etc………
, German defeat was inevitable." taylorjohn21
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